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<p>The project system is an important policy tool to fill the regulatory vacuum of environmental protection in rural China. Using an in-depth case study, this article examines how the project system operates as a functional substitute for infrastructural power in rural environmental governance. The analysis reveals that the state resorts to the project system as a substitute mode of governance. This substitution operates through three interrelated mechanisms: (1) strategic site selection that prioritizes demonstration potential over environmental need; (2) managed mobilization that orchestrates compliance through persuasion and spectacle; and (3) goal displacement and fiscal triage. While projects can temporarily fill the rural regulatory vacuum, they may also constrain long-term capacity-building by prioritizing political visibility over systematic institutional development, distorting resource allocation, and marginalizing public participation. This study extends the infrastructural/despotic power framework to rural environmental governance in China and advances the theoretical understanding of state adaptation under capacity constraints.</p>

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Governance by Project: Substituting for Infrastructural Power in Rural China’s Environmental Protection

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年8月5日

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  • Shihong Guo

摘要

The project system is an important policy tool to fill the regulatory vacuum of environmental protection in rural China. Using an in-depth case study, this article examines how the project system operates as a functional substitute for infrastructural power in rural environmental governance. The analysis reveals that the state resorts to the project system as a substitute mode of governance. This substitution operates through three interrelated mechanisms: (1) strategic site selection that prioritizes demonstration potential over environmental need; (2) managed mobilization that orchestrates compliance through persuasion and spectacle; and (3) goal displacement and fiscal triage. While projects can temporarily fill the rural regulatory vacuum, they may also constrain long-term capacity-building by prioritizing political visibility over systematic institutional development, distorting resource allocation, and marginalizing public participation. This study extends the infrastructural/despotic power framework to rural environmental governance in China and advances the theoretical understanding of state adaptation under capacity constraints.