Securing remote computation with algebraic signature techniques in trusted execution environments
摘要
The security and privacy of remote computational processes are critical in today’s interconnected environment. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-based isolation to protect sensitive data and operations, yet they remain vulnerable to side-channel attacks and software-based exploits. To address these challenges, we propose the Algebraic Signature (AS)-based TEE protocol, a remote attestation framework that integrates ASs directly into enclave-based verification. This integration binds lightweight integrity checks to hardware-backed assurances while avoiding the prohibitive costs of pairing-based constructions. By using the homomorphic properties of ASs, the protocol achieves efficient block-level verification with reduced computational and storage overhead. Our security analysis highlights the resilience of the design, while experimental evaluation demonstrates superior performance compared to existing methods. Results confirm that AS-based TEE protocol provides verifiable assurance of remote computation without heavy overhead, making it a practical and scalable solution for cloud computing, the Internet of Things, and other security-critical domains.