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<p>Unlike traditional Internet of Things (IoT), Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) operate in open environments and transmit information through wireless communication technologies, making VANETs more susceptible to various attacks. To protect the security of drivers’ private information and improve the efficiency of the transportation system, various Certificateless Signcryption (CLSC) schemes have been proposed. Recently, Shao et al. designed a provably secure lightweight authentication scheme, which satisfied aggregate signcryption and batch unsigncryption. Unfortunately, we uncovered there are some vulnerabilities through security analysis in their scheme. In this paper, we first give an analysis method based on their security model with public key replacement to demonstrate the weakness. Second, we introduce a security enhanced CLSC scheme with a small index, demonstrating that the improved scheme is existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA), indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2), and our scheme can resist extra Type-III adversaries which can combine the invalid signcryptions to generate a valid signcryption by formal security proof and heuristic security analysis. Finally, we compare our scheme with recent CLSC schemes in security performance, computation overhead, and communication overhead. The computational overhead of our scheme is below 41 ms under computing resource constraints while still meeting extremely high levels of security. The results show that our scheme is more suitable for VANETs.</p>

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A security enhanced certificateless aggregate signcryption scheme for VANETs

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年6月7日

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  • Dong Liu,
  • Wentao Tang,
  • Liangliang Wang,
  • Yang Liu,
  • Zhiquan Liu,
  • Kai Zhang,
  • Weiwei Li

摘要

Unlike traditional Internet of Things (IoT), Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) operate in open environments and transmit information through wireless communication technologies, making VANETs more susceptible to various attacks. To protect the security of drivers’ private information and improve the efficiency of the transportation system, various Certificateless Signcryption (CLSC) schemes have been proposed. Recently, Shao et al. designed a provably secure lightweight authentication scheme, which satisfied aggregate signcryption and batch unsigncryption. Unfortunately, we uncovered there are some vulnerabilities through security analysis in their scheme. In this paper, we first give an analysis method based on their security model with public key replacement to demonstrate the weakness. Second, we introduce a security enhanced CLSC scheme with a small index, demonstrating that the improved scheme is existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA), indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2), and our scheme can resist extra Type-III adversaries which can combine the invalid signcryptions to generate a valid signcryption by formal security proof and heuristic security analysis. Finally, we compare our scheme with recent CLSC schemes in security performance, computation overhead, and communication overhead. The computational overhead of our scheme is below 41 ms under computing resource constraints while still meeting extremely high levels of security. The results show that our scheme is more suitable for VANETs.