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<p>The general nature of reasoning is that of resolving the conflict between a formula and opposing formulae, e.g., its negation, which together will result in an inconsistency. This resolution process becomes more challenging when the premises themselves are conflicting. Nevertheless, if we accept that reasoning is about handling conflict then reasoning with inconsistency should be a natural and primary logical concept. This paper studies Argumentation Logic (AL) as a paraconsisent logic that naturally applies to logical reasoning under any set of premises, consistent or not. It presents AL as an inherently paraconsistent logical framework where the non-paraconsistent case of reasoning, i.e., reasoning with consistent premises, appears as a special limiting case of the paraconsistent logic.</p>

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On the Paraconsistency of Argumentation Logic

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年10月10日

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  • Antonis Kakas

摘要

The general nature of reasoning is that of resolving the conflict between a formula and opposing formulae, e.g., its negation, which together will result in an inconsistency. This resolution process becomes more challenging when the premises themselves are conflicting. Nevertheless, if we accept that reasoning is about handling conflict then reasoning with inconsistency should be a natural and primary logical concept. This paper studies Argumentation Logic (AL) as a paraconsisent logic that naturally applies to logical reasoning under any set of premises, consistent or not. It presents AL as an inherently paraconsistent logical framework where the non-paraconsistent case of reasoning, i.e., reasoning with consistent premises, appears as a special limiting case of the paraconsistent logic.