<p>On my reading, Harris’s essay centers on a distinction between two visions of Confucian sagehood, one oriented around moral perfection and the other around a more humble love of learning from exemplars, and the essay argues that moral perfection is both a mischaracterization of the Confucian sage and a morally flawed ideal. Arguably, however, Harris too hastily dismisses both the possibility and the usefulness of Confucian moral perfection (perhaps “perfectibility” is a more informative term). This reply explores putative forms of moral perfection found in the early Confucian texts, and which do not seem vulnerable to the problems that Harris associates with it. These include the texts’ appeals to an idealized moral psychology, and to regulative ideals. For example, it is not clear that appeal to regulative moral principles leads to a <i>harmful</i> simplification of moral thought. I conclude by considering some promising ideas integral to Harris’s claims about an alternative Confucian sagehood, which suggest the essay as a possible work of “Progressive Confucianism”—a contribution to recent attempts to develop a contemporary and revivified Confucian outlook. This is a form of sagehood and moral progress characterized by fallibility: readiness to analogize from those close at hand, the usefulness of doubt and deferred normative judgment, and the quest to uncover one’s mistakes, in which uncertainty is a stimulant to the imagination.</p>