<p>A comprehensive theory of well-being should be capable of distinguishing between adaptive preferences that are consistent with flourishing and those that are inconsistent. While both objective and subjective theories of well-being differ in their explanations for the prudential disvalue of certain adaptive preferences, their analysis mostly focuses on the problematic content of such preferences. That is, they consider whether the fulfillment of such preferences contributes to a flourishing life. When analyzing the prudential value of the adaptive preference formation process, the predominant accounts often concentrate on determining whether the adaptive preference is rational or not, and whether the autonomy of an agent is being undermined or valued. Nevertheless, the rationality of preferences and the value of autonomy cannot fully encompass the prudential considerations of the adaptive preference formation process. In this essay, I employ a Zhuangzi-inspired conception of flourishing as a transformative agent to illustrate that we can differentiate between a positive adaptation process and a negative one, regardless of the resulting preferences’ contents. On this account, flourishing as a transformative agent means thriving without committing to an entrenched conception of a good life, but rather consistently engaging in the process of determining what a good life looks like for a transformative and developing self. On this view, some adaptive preferences are detrimental to individuals not only due to their problematic contents, but also because they reflect a dominating and/or alienating relationship between the agent and their conception of the good, impeding a person's ability to flourish as a transformative being.</p>