<p>Modern theorists derive principles of equality from the classical Confucian texts, especially the <i>Mencius</i>, hoping to establish Confucian grounds for human rights, human dignity, and other forms of moral, social, and political equality. These egalitarian versions of Mencian Confucianism overwhelmingly replicate the logic of modern doctrines of rights and dignity, which see individuals as equal bearers of basic human worth who make equal, reciprocal moral claims on one another. This essay illuminates a different and more distinctively Mencian path to affirming principles and policies of social equality. It shows that, while Mencius does not explicitly affirm the doctrine of reciprocal respect that is often drawn out of his teachings, he does promote an imperative to extend a uniform, basic level of care to all people. This is laid out on both political and personal levels, as regards government’s relation to the people and how people regard and treat others in daily life. This more traditionally Confucian path to equal regard and treatment differs from today’s predominant manner of theorizing moral and political equality in its being asymmetrical (nonreciprocal) and in operating through concrete relations of care rather than abstract principles of the right. As such, it avoids some persistent concerns about the way rights doctrines and other modern theories of equality have been formulated, making it also a philosophically and practically compelling alternative to the predominant contemporary model.</p>