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<p>This paper uses GODAD data on World Bank-funded project locations and World Bank Independent Evaluation Group project ratings to assess the impact of recipient country domestic politics on the development effectiveness of aid projects. Following recent research on the impact of spatial dimensions of recipient country domestic politics on project location selection (political siting), this paper considers how these same factors impact project implementation (political implementation). I explore how political siting and political implementation impact World Bank-funded investment project outcomes using a sample of projects approved between 1995 and 2020 and evaluated between 1998 and 2024. The analysis uncovers little evidence that political siting impacts project outcomes (likely because results are confounded by politically driven cherry picking) but does identify substantial variation in project performance linked to political implementation. This effect is only apparent when the recipient government has leverage over the World Bank because of its importance to the United States.</p>

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The politics of location and aid effectiveness: Political siting versus political implementation

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月21日

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  • Christopher Kilby

摘要

This paper uses GODAD data on World Bank-funded project locations and World Bank Independent Evaluation Group project ratings to assess the impact of recipient country domestic politics on the development effectiveness of aid projects. Following recent research on the impact of spatial dimensions of recipient country domestic politics on project location selection (political siting), this paper considers how these same factors impact project implementation (political implementation). I explore how political siting and political implementation impact World Bank-funded investment project outcomes using a sample of projects approved between 1995 and 2020 and evaluated between 1998 and 2024. The analysis uncovers little evidence that political siting impacts project outcomes (likely because results are confounded by politically driven cherry picking) but does identify substantial variation in project performance linked to political implementation. This effect is only apparent when the recipient government has leverage over the World Bank because of its importance to the United States.