<p>Recent technological advances enable firms to engage more effectively with customers who reveal their intent to churn. When consumers disclose such intentions, firms can offer targeted discounts, a form of personalized pricing, to encourage retention. Prior literature, however, shows that broad use of personalized pricing for all returning customers can intensify competition and erode profits in competitive markets. We show that these adverse effects are substantially mitigated when personalized prices are offered selectively, i.e., only after firms identify consumers who are likely to churn. Analyzing a retention-focused personalized pricing strategy, we find three main results. First, personalized pricing increases firm profits only when the proportion of disclosers is relatively low; although it raises margins on retained customers, it also intensifies first-period competition. Second, consumer surplus and social welfare improve when the share of disclosers is high, because higher disclosure induces stronger price reductions and greater retention. Third, firms often have incentives to invest in personalized pricing capabilities, but mutual investment can generate a Prisoner’s Dilemma: Even with low investment costs, simultaneous adoption may strengthen competition and reduce industry profits. These results emphasize the importance of selective targeting and timing when deploying personalized pricing for retention and offer guidance for firms and policymakers considering such investments.</p>

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Value of Personalized Pricing in Customer Retention

  • Wangyang Lu,
  • Huiqi Guan,
  • Tianjun Feng

摘要

Recent technological advances enable firms to engage more effectively with customers who reveal their intent to churn. When consumers disclose such intentions, firms can offer targeted discounts, a form of personalized pricing, to encourage retention. Prior literature, however, shows that broad use of personalized pricing for all returning customers can intensify competition and erode profits in competitive markets. We show that these adverse effects are substantially mitigated when personalized prices are offered selectively, i.e., only after firms identify consumers who are likely to churn. Analyzing a retention-focused personalized pricing strategy, we find three main results. First, personalized pricing increases firm profits only when the proportion of disclosers is relatively low; although it raises margins on retained customers, it also intensifies first-period competition. Second, consumer surplus and social welfare improve when the share of disclosers is high, because higher disclosure induces stronger price reductions and greater retention. Third, firms often have incentives to invest in personalized pricing capabilities, but mutual investment can generate a Prisoner’s Dilemma: Even with low investment costs, simultaneous adoption may strengthen competition and reduce industry profits. These results emphasize the importance of selective targeting and timing when deploying personalized pricing for retention and offer guidance for firms and policymakers considering such investments.