<p>In an influential account of humility, Robert C. Roberts defines humility as low concern for one’s social status as opposed to pride and its various forms. But how is the status in question to be understood? Is the paradigmatic case of an unhumble person someone who craves to win the most prestigious philosophy chair in the world? In this contribution, I will show that the unhumble caring for social status can have an internalised form which is much more difficult to identify since it manifests as a desire to be excellent or superior not in the eyes of others but in one’s own eyes, as is the case with self-satisfaction or smugness. In order to clarify this, I contrast this invidious unhumble case with an innocuous ambition, say, to be an excellent philosopher. I will consider and reject two candidates for marking the invidious case: first, the competitive emotions of envy and jealousy experienced by its subject; and second, the competitive or comparative way in which her superior status is constructed. I conclude that in order to explain the difference, it is necessary to look deeper into the person’s moral psychology, namely, into her sense of her own worth. I claim that what marks the invidious case of the excellent philosopher is a certain misconception of her sense of her worth: she not only cares too much for the social status her excellence gives her, but she also derives her own worth from it. An unhumble person thus mistakes her (internalised) social worth for her worth as a person.</p>