An Abductive Argument for the Badness of Death
摘要
Contemporary philosophers recognize a tension between Epicureanism about death—the view that death cannot be bad for the one who dies—and our commonsense judgment that it is generally morally wrong to kill a person. They observe that what intuitively explains why killing is wrong is precisely that death is bad for the one who dies. In this paper, I develop an anti-Epicurean argument grounded in this tension. More specifically, I defend an abductive argument, or inference to the best explanation argument, against Epicureanism about death. My argument involves two claims: (1) that death is bad for the one who dies, if true, would explain why killing is wrong, and (2) Epicureans lack a better, or equally good, explanation of why killing is wrong. If these claims are successfully defended, then solely on the basis of the conviction that killing is wrong, we have reason to favor the commonsense anti-Epicurean view of death. Thus, other things being equal, our belief in the wrongness of killing provides a reason to reject Epicureanism.