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<p>Epistemologists have increasingly recognized that epistemic trust, understood as an intellectual virtue, plays a crucial role in the generation and transmission of knowledge. Drawing on work in epistemology as well as relevant empirical research in psychology, this paper aims to contribute to ongoing discussions of epistemic trust by offering a trustor-centered account of its epistemic structure. I propose that responsible epistemic trust is regulated by two complementary epistemic capacities:&#xa0;epistemic acuity&#xa0;and&#xa0;epistemic vigilance. Epistemic acuity enables trustors to attend to positive indicators of a potential trustee’s competence, goodwill, and understanding, while epistemic vigilance equips them to register defeaters, including signs of incompetence, insincerity, and problematic communicative content or style. Rather than providing a complete analysis of trust, the paper clarifies how epistemic trust can be exercised as an intellectual virtue by guiding reliance on others under conditions of epistemic dependence.</p>

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The Structure of Epistemic Trust

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月2日

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  • Jie Wen

摘要

Epistemologists have increasingly recognized that epistemic trust, understood as an intellectual virtue, plays a crucial role in the generation and transmission of knowledge. Drawing on work in epistemology as well as relevant empirical research in psychology, this paper aims to contribute to ongoing discussions of epistemic trust by offering a trustor-centered account of its epistemic structure. I propose that responsible epistemic trust is regulated by two complementary epistemic capacities: epistemic acuity and epistemic vigilance. Epistemic acuity enables trustors to attend to positive indicators of a potential trustee’s competence, goodwill, and understanding, while epistemic vigilance equips them to register defeaters, including signs of incompetence, insincerity, and problematic communicative content or style. Rather than providing a complete analysis of trust, the paper clarifies how epistemic trust can be exercised as an intellectual virtue by guiding reliance on others under conditions of epistemic dependence.