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<p>Anderson (2011) offers a set of epistemic criteria by which novices can trust experts. Yet purely epistemic criteria are incomplete, since expert testimony often includes normative guidance that goes beyond descriptive claims. As Rudner (1953) notes, expert advice inevitably embeds value choices. Bennett (2022) sharpens this point by distinguishing epistemic trust from recommendation trust: lending credence to an expert’s descriptive claims is not the same as crediting their normative recommendations. Building on this distinction, I propose a method for novices to disentangle the descriptive from the normative dimensions of expert advice. The method makes explicit the conditional, value‑based premises on which expert advice rests. This enables more informed decision‑making, especially when expert and novice values diverge.</p>

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The Normative Dimension of Trusting Expert Advice

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月1日

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  • Dian Yu

摘要

Anderson (2011) offers a set of epistemic criteria by which novices can trust experts. Yet purely epistemic criteria are incomplete, since expert testimony often includes normative guidance that goes beyond descriptive claims. As Rudner (1953) notes, expert advice inevitably embeds value choices. Bennett (2022) sharpens this point by distinguishing epistemic trust from recommendation trust: lending credence to an expert’s descriptive claims is not the same as crediting their normative recommendations. Building on this distinction, I propose a method for novices to disentangle the descriptive from the normative dimensions of expert advice. The method makes explicit the conditional, value‑based premises on which expert advice rests. This enables more informed decision‑making, especially when expert and novice values diverge.