Shnayderman’s (2025) objection to limitarianism is based on this distributive view’s “blind spot” – a supposed inability to accommodate a capability to achieve self-realisation that might require an indefinite amount of wealth. In the present paper I want to deconstruct this objection to limitarianism, by arguing that any non-ideal account of limitarianism ought to take into consideration the negative externalities of extreme wealth, irrespective of how reasonable or innocuous the objectives pursued by the super-rich seem to be. I focus on three such externalities: the negative impact of wealth discrepancies upon a political community, the increased vulnerability to populist takeover and the intergenerational impact of wealth. In the second half of the paper, I construct a different objection, based on what I call the reverse bottomless pit case. Both arguments converge towards the conclusion that under non-ideal circumstances even seemingly innocuous super-rich might constitute a peril to justice, democracy, and even their fellow citizens. Thus, any normative consideration that might sustain a limitless capability to achieve self-realisation is outweighed by the requirement to protect these other dimensions, a trade-off that is deeply interwoven with limitarianism’s character as a problem-driven account of justice.
