Event-Causal Libertarianism without Settling
摘要
John Lemos sets out an event-causal libertarian view that is like Robert Kane’s except that it crucially substitutes indeterministic weightings for Kane’s efforts of will. I contend, using the disappearing agent argument, that neither Kane’s nor Lemos’s accounts secure an agent’s settling which action to perform in an indeterministic setting. An agent settles which option for action occurs just in case she determines, not necessarily causally, which action occurs, and she makes the difference as to which action occurs. I then propose that Lemos’s indeterministic-weightings event-causal libertarianism is viable without such settling, and that the advantages he aims to secure through libertarianism generally are largely recouped by the resulting position. Specifically, the desert in holding morally responsible to which Lemos is committed can be framed as nonbasic desert, and the advantages Lemos cites for indeterministic libertarianism that require neither settling nor desert, such as the advantage for the value of love, can be retained.