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<p>In contrast to antinatalist positions, I will pose the question of whether it might not only be ethically permissible, but even <i>imperative</i> to have children. I will set out an argument that there is indeed a pro tanto duty to procreate, which I understand as a specification of the duty to help others. To begin with, I will present a fictitious scenario to develop the question of whether there could be a duty to procreate (1). Before presenting my argument in detail, I will set out a number of presuppositions my argument does <i>not</i> require (2). I will then present the <i>argument from the last humans</i> (3). Since it mainly refers to the suffering of the last human beings as a <i>factum brutum</i>, my argument has the advantage of having only very modest presuppositions and being independent of any specific deontological or consequentialist conceptions of ethics. Finally, I will address at length several objections, including the claim that the argument presented has no relevance to our lives (4).</p>

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The Morality of Having Children. Procreation as a Duty to Help Others

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年9月1日

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  • Elke Elisabeth Schmidt

摘要

In contrast to antinatalist positions, I will pose the question of whether it might not only be ethically permissible, but even imperative to have children. I will set out an argument that there is indeed a pro tanto duty to procreate, which I understand as a specification of the duty to help others. To begin with, I will present a fictitious scenario to develop the question of whether there could be a duty to procreate (1). Before presenting my argument in detail, I will set out a number of presuppositions my argument does not require (2). I will then present the argument from the last humans (3). Since it mainly refers to the suffering of the last human beings as a factum brutum, my argument has the advantage of having only very modest presuppositions and being independent of any specific deontological or consequentialist conceptions of ethics. Finally, I will address at length several objections, including the claim that the argument presented has no relevance to our lives (4).