<p>We put some pressure on the utility of the pathological complexity thesis by considering the challenge of nonconscious mentality. Here’s the problem in a nutshell. Suppose we grant Veit’s view that “hedonically felt valence is the best explanation of how animals came to deal with [pathological] complexity and thus how consciousness gradually evolved.” It remains an open question as to when pathological complexity reached the point where there was a fitness advantage for individuals with the capacity for hedonically felt valence. So, if Veit wants to say, for instance, that consciousness arose at some era, then he owes us a story about why conscious valenced states have more explanatory power in that era than nonconscious valenced states. But Veit doesn’t provide that story. Instead, he bases his timeline for the origin of consciousness on evidence of valence simpliciter—not conscious valence.</p>

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On the Utility of the Pathological Complexity Thesis

  • Bob Fischer,
  • Meghan Barrett

摘要

We put some pressure on the utility of the pathological complexity thesis by considering the challenge of nonconscious mentality. Here’s the problem in a nutshell. Suppose we grant Veit’s view that “hedonically felt valence is the best explanation of how animals came to deal with [pathological] complexity and thus how consciousness gradually evolved.” It remains an open question as to when pathological complexity reached the point where there was a fitness advantage for individuals with the capacity for hedonically felt valence. So, if Veit wants to say, for instance, that consciousness arose at some era, then he owes us a story about why conscious valenced states have more explanatory power in that era than nonconscious valenced states. But Veit doesn’t provide that story. Instead, he bases his timeline for the origin of consciousness on evidence of valence simpliciter—not conscious valence.