<p>Some people are disposed to get away with suberogatory actions—bad actions that push the boundaries of what is permissible without crossing into the impermissible. I will dub these ‘sub-aretaic’ character traits. My aim is threefold. First, I defend the suberogatory against Liberto (<CitationRef CitationID="CR10">2012</CitationRef>) by distinguishing the suberogatory as a moral classification from its permissibility conditions. Second, I introduce two kinds of character traits that are neither virtuous, vicious, nor akratic. ‘Super-aretaic’ traits are beyond virtuous, which J.O. Urmson (<CitationRef CitationID="CR13">1958</CitationRef>) illustrates with saints and heroes. ‘Sub-aretaic’ traits are bad without a disposition to do what is impermissible, which I illustrate with hustlers. Third, I appeal to Barney (<CitationRef CitationID="CR3">2020</CitationRef>)’s account of Aristotelian vice to show that sub-aretaic traits are distinct from vicious and akratic traits.</p>

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The Suberogatory as Bad Character

  • Christian Culak

摘要

Some people are disposed to get away with suberogatory actions—bad actions that push the boundaries of what is permissible without crossing into the impermissible. I will dub these ‘sub-aretaic’ character traits. My aim is threefold. First, I defend the suberogatory against Liberto (2012) by distinguishing the suberogatory as a moral classification from its permissibility conditions. Second, I introduce two kinds of character traits that are neither virtuous, vicious, nor akratic. ‘Super-aretaic’ traits are beyond virtuous, which J.O. Urmson (1958) illustrates with saints and heroes. ‘Sub-aretaic’ traits are bad without a disposition to do what is impermissible, which I illustrate with hustlers. Third, I appeal to Barney (2020)’s account of Aristotelian vice to show that sub-aretaic traits are distinct from vicious and akratic traits.