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<p>Aesthetical cognitivists claim that artworks bear significant cognitive values, such as enlarging knowledge. Non-cognitivists dispute this, criticizing cognitivists’ failure to account for the non-banality of these cognitive achievements. Vis-à-vis this criticism, cognitivists may adopt an understanding-based approach, emphasizing a complex web of beliefs facilitating artwork apprehension. Insofar as dramas are concerned, one of the salient structural features of this belief-web is dramatic reversal, which can be understood in either ways: (1) by appealing to the alliance with post-Gettier epistemology, cognitivists can represent such a reversal as a contrast between a JTB (justified true belief) and its being non-knowledge; (2) by appealing to the Bayesian narrative, cognitivists can also represent such a reversal as a contrast between the improbability of a belief’s being true and its being actually true. Both ways are cognitive-endeavor-requiring, since in the first case, the seeking for a JTB requires audience’s mental imagination/simulation to conceive how an action could be justified from the protagonist’s perspective, while in the second case, the attribution of probability values requires the audience to adeptly associate relevant social or psychological knowledge to the current task.</p>

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Dramatic Reversals Gettierized and Bayesianized to Defend Aesthetical Cognitivism

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年3月1日

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  • Yingjin Xu

摘要

Aesthetical cognitivists claim that artworks bear significant cognitive values, such as enlarging knowledge. Non-cognitivists dispute this, criticizing cognitivists’ failure to account for the non-banality of these cognitive achievements. Vis-à-vis this criticism, cognitivists may adopt an understanding-based approach, emphasizing a complex web of beliefs facilitating artwork apprehension. Insofar as dramas are concerned, one of the salient structural features of this belief-web is dramatic reversal, which can be understood in either ways: (1) by appealing to the alliance with post-Gettier epistemology, cognitivists can represent such a reversal as a contrast between a JTB (justified true belief) and its being non-knowledge; (2) by appealing to the Bayesian narrative, cognitivists can also represent such a reversal as a contrast between the improbability of a belief’s being true and its being actually true. Both ways are cognitive-endeavor-requiring, since in the first case, the seeking for a JTB requires audience’s mental imagination/simulation to conceive how an action could be justified from the protagonist’s perspective, while in the second case, the attribution of probability values requires the audience to adeptly associate relevant social or psychological knowledge to the current task.