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<p>According to metaphysical realists, conscious experiences are caused by a world of independently existing physical objects. This physical reality explains all of the facts about conscious experience and the potential for such experience. Pelczar’s (<CitationRef CitationID="CR11">2022</CitationRef>) phenomenalism is more austere: the world is nothing but experiences and potentials for experiences. Pelczar identifies physical entities with certain of these potentials; for example, a stone is identified with the potential for observers to have various cohering experiences as of a stone. In this paper, I raise three objections to the phenomenalist’s account of physical reality. I also respond to certain objections that Pelczar raises against realism.</p>

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Three Critiques of Phenomenalism

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年4月1日

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  • Robert Smithson

摘要

According to metaphysical realists, conscious experiences are caused by a world of independently existing physical objects. This physical reality explains all of the facts about conscious experience and the potential for such experience. Pelczar’s (2022) phenomenalism is more austere: the world is nothing but experiences and potentials for experiences. Pelczar identifies physical entities with certain of these potentials; for example, a stone is identified with the potential for observers to have various cohering experiences as of a stone. In this paper, I raise three objections to the phenomenalist’s account of physical reality. I also respond to certain objections that Pelczar raises against realism.