<p>Recently, it has been suggested that as the climate crisis intensifies, we can justify a rapid climate transition as a way of avoiding significant harm to people whose identities are already fixed, or in other words, without addressing the non-identity problem. This would allow those who take a comparative harm approach to climate justice to argue that a climate transition is preferable to a business-as-usual emissions scenario, even though the former will have a non-identity effect on the majority of people yet to be conceived. In this article, I explore the consequences that biting the philosophical bullet of the non-identity problem has&#xa0;for the fair distribution of the climate burden. I argue that using the fixed-identity argument to answer the climate action question of climate justice forces proponents of the comparative harm approach to move from compensatory to distributive arguments in answering the burden sharing question. Biting the bullet of the non-identity problem therefore makes no difference to the climatic future we should aim for as long as we can rely on the fixed-identity argument, but it does affect how much each of us should contribute to it, at least from a harm-based perspective.</p>

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The Burden-Sharing Implications of the Fixed-Identity Argument in Climate Ethics

  • Fausto Corvino

摘要

Recently, it has been suggested that as the climate crisis intensifies, we can justify a rapid climate transition as a way of avoiding significant harm to people whose identities are already fixed, or in other words, without addressing the non-identity problem. This would allow those who take a comparative harm approach to climate justice to argue that a climate transition is preferable to a business-as-usual emissions scenario, even though the former will have a non-identity effect on the majority of people yet to be conceived. In this article, I explore the consequences that biting the philosophical bullet of the non-identity problem has for the fair distribution of the climate burden. I argue that using the fixed-identity argument to answer the climate action question of climate justice forces proponents of the comparative harm approach to move from compensatory to distributive arguments in answering the burden sharing question. Biting the bullet of the non-identity problem therefore makes no difference to the climatic future we should aim for as long as we can rely on the fixed-identity argument, but it does affect how much each of us should contribute to it, at least from a harm-based perspective.