<p>Recently, Leidenhag (2021) has argued that the panpsychist should extend their belief to theism. She argues that if the panpsychist wants to tackle emergence, then they must be committed to two explanatory metaphysical principles, either the Causal Principle or the Principle of Sufficient Reason. That is one reason for the panpsychist to be a theist, since these principles favour theism over non-theism. Another reason Leidenhag illustrates is the problem of locating ‘bruteness’, which tries to show that theism is better equipped to tackle this over panpsychism. In this paper, I have three aims. First, I attempt to show that the panpsychist need not accept any of those explanatory principles. Secondly, I attempt to argue that even if they must accept at least one of the principles, neither of them being true favours theism over non-theism and does not forward the dialectic from metaphysics of consciousness for support to a theological view. Third, I attempt to reject the claim that the problem of locating bruteness is any evidence for theism.</p>