Scholarlink

<p>This experimental study introduces a threshold inequality into a classic threshold public goods game to understand coordinating behavior under asymmetric conditions. We use a novel design with “advantaged” players who have a lower threshold than a “disadvantaged” player, reflecting real-world public good scenarios. The threshold inequality disrupts the efficient coordination we observe in the control sessions leading to welfare losses relative to a control group without a disadvantaged player. Threshold inequality creates opportunities to help a disadvantaged player while enabling advantaged players to potentially free ride. We find evidence that threshold inequalities make the Pareto efficient provisioning of public goods more challenging, leading to suboptimal outcomes.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Threshold inequality in a public good experiment

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月27日

查看全文
  • Therese Cavlovic,
  • Matthew Gnagey,
  • Brandon C Koford,
  • Gavin Roberts

摘要

This experimental study introduces a threshold inequality into a classic threshold public goods game to understand coordinating behavior under asymmetric conditions. We use a novel design with “advantaged” players who have a lower threshold than a “disadvantaged” player, reflecting real-world public good scenarios. The threshold inequality disrupts the efficient coordination we observe in the control sessions leading to welfare losses relative to a control group without a disadvantaged player. Threshold inequality creates opportunities to help a disadvantaged player while enabling advantaged players to potentially free ride. We find evidence that threshold inequalities make the Pareto efficient provisioning of public goods more challenging, leading to suboptimal outcomes.