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<p>War between rivalrous great powers (GPW) often is not a deliberate choice. Historically, great powers have pursued a combination of activities to discuss differences, clarify intentions, and establish ‘guard rails’ that inhibit unintended escalation into generalized war. Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), Confidence &amp; Security Building Measures (CSBMs), and structural arms control are three classic methods to reduce the risk of a security incident triggering rapid escalation into GPW. The Sino-American great power rivalry in the western Indo-Pacific incorporates the conflicting interests, flashpoints and potential triggering events that exacerbate the risks of GPW, suggesting that risk reduction initiatives and arms control agreements may help leaders choose de-escalation over war during triggering events. An analysis of past great power arms control arrangements and verification protocols indicate that most requisite preconditions for them are not present between China and the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific today. Thus, modest Sino-U.S. CBMs focused on enhanced political dialogue, recurring political-military forums, reciprocal information exchanges, direct leadership communications, and declaratory commitments without expansive transparency or on-site verification- appear the most logical approach to reduce the risks of GPW in the western Indo- Pacific today while simultaneously building-out necessary great power trust for future arms control and risk reduction measures.</p>

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To Prevent a Great Power War: Conflict Prevention Efforts and Possibilities by the U.S. and China

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月14日

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  • Thomas F. Lynch III

摘要

War between rivalrous great powers (GPW) often is not a deliberate choice. Historically, great powers have pursued a combination of activities to discuss differences, clarify intentions, and establish ‘guard rails’ that inhibit unintended escalation into generalized war. Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), Confidence & Security Building Measures (CSBMs), and structural arms control are three classic methods to reduce the risk of a security incident triggering rapid escalation into GPW. The Sino-American great power rivalry in the western Indo-Pacific incorporates the conflicting interests, flashpoints and potential triggering events that exacerbate the risks of GPW, suggesting that risk reduction initiatives and arms control agreements may help leaders choose de-escalation over war during triggering events. An analysis of past great power arms control arrangements and verification protocols indicate that most requisite preconditions for them are not present between China and the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific today. Thus, modest Sino-U.S. CBMs focused on enhanced political dialogue, recurring political-military forums, reciprocal information exchanges, direct leadership communications, and declaratory commitments without expansive transparency or on-site verification- appear the most logical approach to reduce the risks of GPW in the western Indo- Pacific today while simultaneously building-out necessary great power trust for future arms control and risk reduction measures.