CFO antecedents of accounting wrongdoing: a literature review
摘要
This study reports on chief financial officer (CFO) wrongdoing in accounting. It analyzes and synthesizes the evidence of this research stream to reveal why CFOs commit this type of misconduct and to highlight differences to chief executive officers (CEOs). We structure our systematic literature review based on the fraud diamond framework and report about studies on a CFO’s pressure, opportunity, rationalization, and capability to commit accounting wrongdoing. The 64 articles uncover similarities and differences with the CEO and demonstrate that CFOs predominantly possess stronger incentives, equal opportunities, similar or stronger rationalization, and a more wide-ranging capacity to commit accounting wrongdoing. Their context-specific settings lead to diverging accounting wrongdoing types, such as real EM (REM) and accrual EM (AEM). Our review indicates future research possibilities and suggests studying combined fraud diamond dimensions and moderators on the individual, firm, and environmental levels to explain the inconclusive results of this research stream.