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<p>Water resource allocation is a complicated decision-making challenge that is intertwined with regional water resource planning and management. To solve this issue, we develop and apply an evolutionary game model based on three-way decision theory to the distribution of water resources in river basins, while also taking into account the cost learning effect. The replication dynamics and evolutionary stability techniques of the allocation of water resources among water resource producers are also investigated. This study abandons the conventional perfect rationality hypothesis and adopts bounded rationality as the basic premise for decision-makers, which is more suitable for the practical behavior patterns of stakeholders involved in water resource systems. Lyapunov stability analysis is employed in the evolutionary game among water resource producers, and only one equilibrium point <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(E_1(0, 0)\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> is obtained under bounded rationality conditions. The equilibrium result suggests that water resource producers will not choose ultra water intake or not promise to excess water intake strategies, and will gradually evolve toward the standard water intake strategy. Furthermore, an analysis of the evolutionary stable strategies between the administrative water resource regulators and water resource producers revealed that the model supports a unique evolutionary stable strategy designated as ESS (0,&#xa0;0,&#xa0;1,&#xa0;0). In this stable state, water resource producers maintain standard water withdrawal, while the administrative water resource regulators implements high-intensity regulation. Additionally, the incentive method of suitable rewards and penalties can successfully reduce excessive water consumption, resolving the dispute over the distribution of water resources.</p>

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Evolution of Water Resources Allocation in Watersheds Based on the Three-Way Decisions Theory

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月19日

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  • Zuliang Lu,
  • Zhuran Xiang,
  • Zhihui Cao,
  • Lu Xing,
  • Mingsong Li,
  • Junman Li

摘要

Water resource allocation is a complicated decision-making challenge that is intertwined with regional water resource planning and management. To solve this issue, we develop and apply an evolutionary game model based on three-way decision theory to the distribution of water resources in river basins, while also taking into account the cost learning effect. The replication dynamics and evolutionary stability techniques of the allocation of water resources among water resource producers are also investigated. This study abandons the conventional perfect rationality hypothesis and adopts bounded rationality as the basic premise for decision-makers, which is more suitable for the practical behavior patterns of stakeholders involved in water resource systems. Lyapunov stability analysis is employed in the evolutionary game among water resource producers, and only one equilibrium point \(E_1(0, 0)\) is obtained under bounded rationality conditions. The equilibrium result suggests that water resource producers will not choose ultra water intake or not promise to excess water intake strategies, and will gradually evolve toward the standard water intake strategy. Furthermore, an analysis of the evolutionary stable strategies between the administrative water resource regulators and water resource producers revealed that the model supports a unique evolutionary stable strategy designated as ESS (0, 0, 1, 0). In this stable state, water resource producers maintain standard water withdrawal, while the administrative water resource regulators implements high-intensity regulation. Additionally, the incentive method of suitable rewards and penalties can successfully reduce excessive water consumption, resolving the dispute over the distribution of water resources.