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<p>Unsustainable operational modes have led to non-green consequences in inter-basin water transfer (IBWT) projects worldwide. From a green supply chain perspective, this study develops a multi-stage differential game model to examine green operational strategies and cost-sharing mechanisms for IBWT projects, considering the time-varying dynamics of water green degree (WGD). Numerical analyses based on China’s South-to-North Water Diversion Project reveal: (i) Upstream supplier greening efforts are more effective than downstream investments, with cumulative efforts enabling downstream WGD levels to be higher than upstream intakes; (ii) Bilateral cost-sharing coordination increases total water demand by 102.23% and total supply chain profit by 95.22% compared to no-contract scenarios; (iii) Distributors bear higher costs (48.83%–65%) than suppliers (2.97%–48.97%), incentivizing WGD efforts for balanced partnerships; (iv) Improving pollution control efficiency, risk resistance capability and consumers’ green preference are conducive to maintaining WGD and promoting operational performance. These findings demonstrate that bilateral cost-sharing contracts with coordinated decision-making significantly enhance both economic and environmental performance in IBWT projects.</p>

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Green Operational Strategy and Cost Sharing Mechanism for the Inter-Basin Water Transfer Project: A Differential Game-Theoretical Study from the Supply Chain Perspective

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月28日

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  • Zhisong Chen,
  • Danli Chen,
  • Rong Yu,
  • Andrea Appolloni,
  • Huimin Wang

摘要

Unsustainable operational modes have led to non-green consequences in inter-basin water transfer (IBWT) projects worldwide. From a green supply chain perspective, this study develops a multi-stage differential game model to examine green operational strategies and cost-sharing mechanisms for IBWT projects, considering the time-varying dynamics of water green degree (WGD). Numerical analyses based on China’s South-to-North Water Diversion Project reveal: (i) Upstream supplier greening efforts are more effective than downstream investments, with cumulative efforts enabling downstream WGD levels to be higher than upstream intakes; (ii) Bilateral cost-sharing coordination increases total water demand by 102.23% and total supply chain profit by 95.22% compared to no-contract scenarios; (iii) Distributors bear higher costs (48.83%–65%) than suppliers (2.97%–48.97%), incentivizing WGD efforts for balanced partnerships; (iv) Improving pollution control efficiency, risk resistance capability and consumers’ green preference are conducive to maintaining WGD and promoting operational performance. These findings demonstrate that bilateral cost-sharing contracts with coordinated decision-making significantly enhance both economic and environmental performance in IBWT projects.