<p>The meta-argumentative approach treats analogical arguments as arguments about other arguments. On this view, the source and target arguments of an analogy are parallel in their argumentative relations. In recent years, Alhambra has extended this approach by linking it to particularism. I argue that the approach faces three difficulties. First, Alhambra’s criticisms of Woods and Hudak are unconvincing because, on a plausible interpretation, Woods and Hudak’s understanding of argumentative relations is compatible with Alhambra’s account. Second, Alhambra’s three central objections to generalism—that it is uncharitable, that it implies deductivism, and that it makes the analogy disappear—fail against at least some sophisticated versions of generalism. Third, the meta-argumentative approach is not clearly particularist, mainly because it implicitly appeals to principles at both the analytical and evaluative levels. Together, these challenges suggest that the distinctiveness of the meta-argumentative approach from generalism remains insufficiently justified, despite its self-presentation as a particularist counterpart.</p>