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<p>Many philosophical accounts of emotional ambivalence tend to emphasize one of two powerful commonsense intuitions: some highlight that ambivalent emotions can be fitting and do not necessarily entail a kind of irrationality; others build on the intuition that ambivalence is sometimes psychologically uncomfortable. This paper argues that these two intuitions can be reconciled, providing an account that accommodates both the fittingness and the discomfort of ambivalent emotions. I first show that ambivalent emotions do not involve any kind of theoretical irrationality by contrasting them with emotional recalcitrance, a form of conflict widely regarded as paradigmatically irrational. After drawing some implications from this comparison, I then employ research in social psychology and behavioral economics to explain why ambivalent emotions are often experienced as unpleasant.</p>

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What’s Wrong with Ambivalent Emotions?

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年6月19日

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  • Giulio Sacco

摘要

Many philosophical accounts of emotional ambivalence tend to emphasize one of two powerful commonsense intuitions: some highlight that ambivalent emotions can be fitting and do not necessarily entail a kind of irrationality; others build on the intuition that ambivalence is sometimes psychologically uncomfortable. This paper argues that these two intuitions can be reconciled, providing an account that accommodates both the fittingness and the discomfort of ambivalent emotions. I first show that ambivalent emotions do not involve any kind of theoretical irrationality by contrasting them with emotional recalcitrance, a form of conflict widely regarded as paradigmatically irrational. After drawing some implications from this comparison, I then employ research in social psychology and behavioral economics to explain why ambivalent emotions are often experienced as unpleasant.