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<p>Philosophy of religion has come under attack in the last few decades from a variety of perspectives. Among the most common criticisms are that philosophy of religion is too focused on Christianity (or Abrahamitic religions in general) and too centred on religious belief as the main aspect of religion. This article introduces some ideas from Wittgenstein’s remarks on the philosophy of religion into this debate, remarks which (although pertinent) have been hitherto not received sufficient attention. In particular, this article argues that Wittgenstein’s own intellectual development from early stages in the <i>Tractatus</i> and his <i>Lectures on Ethics</i> through his middle and late period anticipate these mentioned relatively recent common criticisms of philosophy of religion. In analysing his later writings (especially <i>Culture and Value</i>, <i>Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics</i>,<i> Psychology and Religious Belief</i>, and <i>Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough</i>), it becomes clear that Wittgenstein reconceives philosophical thought on religion not as being about belief, but more neutrally about practice, which, as a quasi-anthropological approach, allows philosophers to approach religious phenomena on their own terms.</p>

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Globalizing Philosophy of Religion on a Wittgensteinian Budget

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月14日

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  • Thomas J. Spiegel

摘要

Philosophy of religion has come under attack in the last few decades from a variety of perspectives. Among the most common criticisms are that philosophy of religion is too focused on Christianity (or Abrahamitic religions in general) and too centred on religious belief as the main aspect of religion. This article introduces some ideas from Wittgenstein’s remarks on the philosophy of religion into this debate, remarks which (although pertinent) have been hitherto not received sufficient attention. In particular, this article argues that Wittgenstein’s own intellectual development from early stages in the Tractatus and his Lectures on Ethics through his middle and late period anticipate these mentioned relatively recent common criticisms of philosophy of religion. In analysing his later writings (especially Culture and Value, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, and Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough), it becomes clear that Wittgenstein reconceives philosophical thought on religion not as being about belief, but more neutrally about practice, which, as a quasi-anthropological approach, allows philosophers to approach religious phenomena on their own terms.