<p>The main intention of this paper is to show that Julian Jaynes’ theory of consciousness complements Brook Ziporyn’s deep “atheology.” Ziporyn’s deep atheism is an emulative atheism that differs from compensatory atheism as well as from both emulative and compensatory theism. It grounds purpose in the purposeless “oceanic.” Julian Jaynes’ theory of consciousness stipulates that subjective consciousness only emerged around ca. 1000 BCE. Prior to this era, humans outsourced their thought processes by producing hallucinatory voices that were imagined to be divine commands and then behaviorally obeyed. Only later did humans “insource” mental agency to an “analog I,” or a self, as the agent of volition and decision-making. The paper outlines a Jaynesian theory of consciousness that conceives of both the outsourced divine agents and the insourced self as imaginary constructs of the operations of consciousness. Both constructs enable the mental epiphenomena of volition and decision-making through language. While for Ziporyn, the purposeless oceanic embeds (human) purpose, for Jaynes, both outsourced (gods) and insourced (self) purposeful agents are embedded in per se purposeless evolutionary processes.</p>

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Volition as an Epiphenomenon: How a Jaynesian Theory of Consciousness Complements Ziporyn’s Deep Atheism

  • Hans-Georg Moeller

摘要

The main intention of this paper is to show that Julian Jaynes’ theory of consciousness complements Brook Ziporyn’s deep “atheology.” Ziporyn’s deep atheism is an emulative atheism that differs from compensatory atheism as well as from both emulative and compensatory theism. It grounds purpose in the purposeless “oceanic.” Julian Jaynes’ theory of consciousness stipulates that subjective consciousness only emerged around ca. 1000 BCE. Prior to this era, humans outsourced their thought processes by producing hallucinatory voices that were imagined to be divine commands and then behaviorally obeyed. Only later did humans “insource” mental agency to an “analog I,” or a self, as the agent of volition and decision-making. The paper outlines a Jaynesian theory of consciousness that conceives of both the outsourced divine agents and the insourced self as imaginary constructs of the operations of consciousness. Both constructs enable the mental epiphenomena of volition and decision-making through language. While for Ziporyn, the purposeless oceanic embeds (human) purpose, for Jaynes, both outsourced (gods) and insourced (self) purposeful agents are embedded in per se purposeless evolutionary processes.