Love, Politics, and Interpretation: What Charity’s Etymology Reveals about the Philosophical Practice
摘要
The word “charity” as philosophers, argumentation theorists, and other charity scholars may already know, is derived from the Latin word caritas, usually translated as “love.” By contrast, "charity" as it is used in contemporary philosophy (usually by those not specializing in charity scholarship), typically refers to something much different: the practice of giving an author or interlocutor the benefit of the doubt, or interpreting another’s argument in the strongest way reasonable (Stern 2016, 288; Concepción 2004, 365). Love, it might seem, is has little to do with the word we use to describe the kind of argumentation and interpretation we endorse. In conversation with these contemporary practices, I trace the etymology of “charity” in order to articulate (1) the indelibly political implications of charitable interpretation and (2) the harms that can result when we call for charity without attending to those political implications within academic philosophy.