<p>As with argumentation in the theoretical realm, addressing claims about what is the case or what to believe, argumentation in the practical realm—including both practical reasoning toward intention and reasoning that includes claims to know-how—can also be interpreted and evaluated more or less charitably. When evaluating arguments about intentions and know-how, however, implementing the principle of charity raises unique considerations, such as how charitably one should be regarding claims about an ability to decide or execute the actions decided upon. In these cases, too much charity or trust may lead to the acceptance of an intention, or trust in an ability, that cannot be completed. While too little charity may unjustly restrict another person from deciding or acting. This paper attempts to map the ability for extant conceptions of the principle of charity, most often applied in the theoretical realm, to apply to practical examples involving practical reasoning and know-how. I argue that when the lack of charity in considering ability stems from a systematic identity prejudice, we start to see the emergence of practical epistemic injustice, which carries harms both novel and recognized in the extant epistemic injustice literature and conclude that a charitable principle of credibility might be better because it can include theoretical argumentation while also accounting for arguments in the practical realm.</p>