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<p>In this paper, we argue that radical embodied cognitive science implies an ethics of responsibility that prioritizes what we refer to as taking collective responsibility. By <i>taking</i> responsibility, we mean that the ethical concept of responsibility ought to be more fundamentally understood in terms of the knowledge-how of the first-person capacity to respond to a situation rather than the knowledge-that of a third-person judgment that an agent ought to respond to a situation. By taking <i>collective</i> responsibility, we mean that all individual human response-taking (or, response-ability) is, to some extent, a collective endeavor. Consequently, we argue that radical embodied cognitive science has a similarly radical consequence for how we ought to think about the ethics of responsibility. To demonstrate, we consider social harms associated with use of social media as a case study to demonstrate what we mean by taking collective responsibility. In short, identifying who or what to hold responsible for social media harms obfuscates the more critical question – how do we each, as individuals, take responsibility for a phenomenon in which we have (nearly) all participated?</p>

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A Radical Embodied Account of Responsibility

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月6日

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  • Zachary Peck,
  • Anthony Chemero

摘要

In this paper, we argue that radical embodied cognitive science implies an ethics of responsibility that prioritizes what we refer to as taking collective responsibility. By taking responsibility, we mean that the ethical concept of responsibility ought to be more fundamentally understood in terms of the knowledge-how of the first-person capacity to respond to a situation rather than the knowledge-that of a third-person judgment that an agent ought to respond to a situation. By taking collective responsibility, we mean that all individual human response-taking (or, response-ability) is, to some extent, a collective endeavor. Consequently, we argue that radical embodied cognitive science has a similarly radical consequence for how we ought to think about the ethics of responsibility. To demonstrate, we consider social harms associated with use of social media as a case study to demonstrate what we mean by taking collective responsibility. In short, identifying who or what to hold responsible for social media harms obfuscates the more critical question – how do we each, as individuals, take responsibility for a phenomenon in which we have (nearly) all participated?