<p>The concept of habit of action plays a decisive role in classic pragmatism. In Charles S. Peirce’s philosophy, habit covers both an original mode of being and an original mode of thought. This conception is part of a broader aim to overtake the theory-practice divide. However, they did not see that this leaning toward practice and their extensive use of the notion of habit, whether mental or physical, pointed to a radical, different view of reasoning. In particular, they did not see how their innovative conception of practice and habit of action hinted at a definition of synthesis and analysis different from Kant’s. To understand this different picture of the whole of reasoning, this paper intends to explore (1) Peirce’s chronological development of the conception of habit of action; (2) a contemporary view of the topic under the name of “gesture” and its logical rationale; and (3) the normative implications that this new “gestural” perspective allows.</p>