<p>The key idea of meta-argumentative theories of argument by analogy is that arguments by analogy compare two arguments in order to show whether or not the premises of one of them are adequately connected to its conclusion, and therefore the argument has the logical properties that depend on that connection. The premises-conclusion relationship can be understood in terms of inferences or in terms of reasons. Consequently I distinguish between an inference-based version and a reasons-based version of the meta-argumentative theory. I argue that an inference-based theory of argument by analogy cannot easily account for neither the usual way of attacking an argument by analogy nor the predominance of counter-analogy over direct analogy. A reasons-based meta-argumentative theory does not face the same difficulties because it recognizes the contextual nature of logical evaluation, distinguishing between the parts of an argument (premises and conclusion) and the contextual factors relevant to its logical evaluation (conditions and modifiers). Contextualizing logical properties enables us to distinguish between cases in which two arguments are not analogous and cases in which their contexts of evaluation are not analogous. Context-dependence also explains why analogies are used more often to show that an argument is invalid than to show that an argument is valid.</p>