<p>Timothy Williamson has argued that a theory of content-determination should focus on knowledge rather than truth; the principle of charity, which says that interpretation should maximize (or optimize) true belief, should be replaced by a principle of knowledge-maximization, which says that interpretation should maximize knowledge. Williamson contends that knowledge-maximization has two important advantages over charity: it generates the right assignments of content in cases that the principle of charity gets wrong; and it can readily explain the fact that people often know, a fact that cannot be generated from the principle that beliefs are generally true. The paper explores the effectiveness of these criticisms of Donald Davidson’s principle of charity. It is argued that Davidson has an effective response to the charge that charity generates implausible assignments of content. If there is a failing in his account, it is not that it yields the wrong assignments but that it does not adequately explain the role of perception in content-determination. It is conceded that Davidson himself does not forge a convincing link between charity and knowledge. The significance of that fact is considered.</p>