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<p>This paper defends the partial continuities—that are sometimes called “kinks”—in the evolutionary trajectory from biology to cognition and from basic to higher cognition. Building on Radical Enactivism (Hutto and Myin in Radicalizing enactivism: basic minds without content, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2013; Hutto and Myin in Evolving enactivism: basic minds meet content, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2017), we reject the view that equates biological processes with cognition, focusing instead on the conceptual bridges needed to connect these domains. The first partial continuity, between life and mind, is explored through Moreno and Mossio’s (Biological autonomy: a philosophical and theoretical enquiry, Springer, Dordrecht, 2015) framework of biological autonomy, which updates the enactivist notion of autopoiesis. Autonomy as "closure of constraints" explains how living systems maintain self-organization, distinguishing them from purely physicochemical systems and avoiding reductionism. The second partial continuity we explore addresses the transition from basic to higher cognition, where Radical Enactivism commits to pervasive know-how. This practical, non-representational knowledge links the active exploration of environmental settings and symbolic cognition, offering a unified yet non-reductive account of cognition. We conclude by considering the role of autonomy in sociocultural practices, showing how collective constraints on symbol use mirror biological self-organization. By integrating autonomy and know-how, this account enriches Radical Enactivism, bridging theoretical gaps and providing a robust framework for understanding cognition as a multi-layered phenomenon.</p>

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From Life to Higher Cognition: Autonomy, Know-How and the Radical Turn

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月23日

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  • Giovanni Rolla,
  • Manoel Abreu Fernandes,
  • Alexandre Lohmann Oliveira

摘要

This paper defends the partial continuities—that are sometimes called “kinks”—in the evolutionary trajectory from biology to cognition and from basic to higher cognition. Building on Radical Enactivism (Hutto and Myin in Radicalizing enactivism: basic minds without content, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2013; Hutto and Myin in Evolving enactivism: basic minds meet content, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2017), we reject the view that equates biological processes with cognition, focusing instead on the conceptual bridges needed to connect these domains. The first partial continuity, between life and mind, is explored through Moreno and Mossio’s (Biological autonomy: a philosophical and theoretical enquiry, Springer, Dordrecht, 2015) framework of biological autonomy, which updates the enactivist notion of autopoiesis. Autonomy as "closure of constraints" explains how living systems maintain self-organization, distinguishing them from purely physicochemical systems and avoiding reductionism. The second partial continuity we explore addresses the transition from basic to higher cognition, where Radical Enactivism commits to pervasive know-how. This practical, non-representational knowledge links the active exploration of environmental settings and symbolic cognition, offering a unified yet non-reductive account of cognition. We conclude by considering the role of autonomy in sociocultural practices, showing how collective constraints on symbol use mirror biological self-organization. By integrating autonomy and know-how, this account enriches Radical Enactivism, bridging theoretical gaps and providing a robust framework for understanding cognition as a multi-layered phenomenon.