<p>This paper delves into one topic in virtue jurisprudence—the virtue-centered approach in judging and uncovers some potential issues in conceptualizing virtue as a constitutive role in legal decisions. Drawing inspiration from virtue argumentation theory, which takes the character of the arguer into argumentation analysis and evaluation, our discussion extends to addressing critiques and proposing the potential response in virtue jurisprudence. We argue for a refined understanding of virtue as central to legal argumentation, proposing adjustments to the counterfactual version as a strong virtue theory and the development of detailed guiding principles for virtuous legal practice. We believe that by drawing insights from virtue argumentation theory, virtue jurisprudence can not only more effectively advocate for the importance of virtue but also deepen our understanding of the role of virtue in the justification of legal decisions. We hope this interdisciplinary dialogue enriches legal theory and promotes a more just and efficient legal practice.</p>