<p>In this paper, we explore some of the social factors that lead people to hold bad beliefs, i.e. beliefs contradicted by clear, strong evidence. First, we critically discuss a recent proposal by Emily Sullivan and colleagues, in which they analyze an individual’s epistemic position within a network based on the number, independence, and diversity of their information sources. Second, we contend that an individual's epistemic position within a network on a topic, <i>t</i>, should instead be defined in terms of (i) the reliability of their trusted sources on <i>t</i> and (ii) the reliability of their higher-order informants in tracking reliable sources on <i>t</i>. We further argue that, at least regarding topics related to one's social or political identity, people often rely on strong-tie contacts (close friends or relatives) as higher-order informants on factual matters. This reliance can, in turn, have the unfortunate consequence of making individuals more vulnerable to bad beliefs. Finally, we discuss different strategies for improving agents’ epistemic positions within a network, inspired by recent work on the sociology of strong ties by Damon Centola and colleagues.</p>