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<p>We explore two behavioral mechanisms that may help explain why voter turnout is often in excess of that predicted by rational choice theory: (1) collectivist voters may derive utility from taking part in a cooperative, collective action with other voters, or (2) voters who overweight small probabilities may overweight the likelihood of influencing the outcome of the election. In experimental elections, we confirm both associations. Voters are more likely to incur a personal cost to vote if they score higher on a measure of psychological collectivism, or alternatively, if they display collectivist tendencies via their cooperative behavior in incentivized prisoner dilemma games. Voters are also more likely to incur a cost to vote if they assign more psychological weight to small probabilities, as measured with incentivized gambles. Neither correlation significantly interacts with the size or skew of the electorate. In addition to explaining the source of some over-voting, our results imply that collectivist and probability weighting individuals are over-represented in voting pools.</p>

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What drives voter turnout? Experimental insights on collectivism and probability weighting

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年8月7日

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  • Marco Faravelli,
  • Benedict Gordon,
  • Joshua Huisman,
  • Vera L. te Velde

摘要

We explore two behavioral mechanisms that may help explain why voter turnout is often in excess of that predicted by rational choice theory: (1) collectivist voters may derive utility from taking part in a cooperative, collective action with other voters, or (2) voters who overweight small probabilities may overweight the likelihood of influencing the outcome of the election. In experimental elections, we confirm both associations. Voters are more likely to incur a personal cost to vote if they score higher on a measure of psychological collectivism, or alternatively, if they display collectivist tendencies via their cooperative behavior in incentivized prisoner dilemma games. Voters are also more likely to incur a cost to vote if they assign more psychological weight to small probabilities, as measured with incentivized gambles. Neither correlation significantly interacts with the size or skew of the electorate. In addition to explaining the source of some over-voting, our results imply that collectivist and probability weighting individuals are over-represented in voting pools.