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<p>In this paper we use rank information to construct a measure of preference satisfaction by collective decision rules and to compare the Borda rule with the plurality rule with respect to the inequality their outcome induces. While the construction of our measure of preference satisfaction is formally equivalent to Borda utilities, it turns out that, with respect to equality, the Borda rule is not necessarily superior to plurality rule for the case of more than three alternatives.</p>

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Rank information and inequality in social welfare functions

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年2月17日

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  • Andreas Darmann,
  • Daniel Eckert,
  • Christian Klamler

摘要

In this paper we use rank information to construct a measure of preference satisfaction by collective decision rules and to compare the Borda rule with the plurality rule with respect to the inequality their outcome induces. While the construction of our measure of preference satisfaction is formally equivalent to Borda utilities, it turns out that, with respect to equality, the Borda rule is not necessarily superior to plurality rule for the case of more than three alternatives.