<p>Prima facie conception can appear mysterious. Having a prima facie grasp of something means being ‘on the edge’ of conceiving. But it seems that often there is no way for us to know if what our intuitions <i>present as</i> prima facie conceivable is <i>actually</i> conceivable, i.e. conceivable under ideal rational reflection. We propose a novel account of prima facie conception: on the basis of working hypotheses concerning the logical interactions of conception, sensory imagination and prima facie conception, we isolate different subtypes of what we call <i>general prima facie conception</i>. With these tools, we explore (what seems to be) the deeper logical substructure of prima facie conception. We hint at how this could help us understand different reasons for different intuitions (for instance, regarding intuitive differences in the truth-value of conditionals with impossible antecedents).</p>