<p>It is widely assumed that grounding resembles causation, and some argue that, like causation, grounding is subject to a <i>proportionality</i> constraint. According to this view, a good grounding explanation should identify a ground that is neither too general nor too specific with respect to the groundee. In this paper, I challenge that position. I begin by highlighting a confusion underlying a general argument for proportionality in grounding. I then critically examine two existing approaches to articulating the constraint, both of which tie proportionality to a notion of <i>difference-making</i>. One account develops this notion in counterfactual terms, while the other appeals to the process of abstraction. I argue that both approaches are inadequate. Finally, I offer a general objection to the imposition of any proportionality constraint on grounding, drawing on a structural feature of grounding itself. The result of this paper deepens our understanding of grounding by revealing a non-parallel between grounding and causation.</p>