There is currently a lively debate in the philosophy of mind literature which employs different versions of what is called “Russellian monism” in explaining how we know the essence of phenomenal properties, such as the way it feels like to see a blue sky. This paper argues that Russell’s theory of descriptions (1905) along with my interpretation of Russell’s neutral monist ontology (1940 onwards) provides an adequate account of our conceptual knowledge of phenomenal qualities, without taking these qualities to belong to a sui generis ontological category. On my interpretation of Russell’s neutral monist theory, our concepts, be they phenomenal, psychological, physical, material or neuroscientific do not reveal any ontological intrinsic nature of the qualities that make up the events (complexes) that constitute all of reality, including human minds. All concepts are translucent; they reveal some features of reality, but not all. Introspection on our phenomenal concepts, which I define in terms of definite descriptions, reveals only certain structural properties of phenomenal events. Introspection on phenomenal concepts does not reveal the neutral nature of phenomenal qualities (of phenomenal events). All qualities (whether internal or external to a mind) are of a neutral kind, not on the ground that we can be acquainted with the neutral intrinsic nature of reality, but on the ground that taking this reality to be of a neutral kind provides the best explanation of the success and coherence of our various epistemological inquiries.
