<p>The term “paradox of fiction” refers to the puzzle whereby, when we watch a film or read a book, we feel emotions toward fictional events, despite knowing that the characters involved do not exist. This issue has been at the center of debates in analytic philosophy of art. However, it has not been adequately addressed by philosophers of emotion. In this article, I use the paradox of fiction as a stress test to evaluate the three major theories of emotion, assessing how each can account for two ordinary intuitions concerning emotions toward fiction: (1) that they are not irrational per se, and (2) that they are not substantially different from the emotions we have in ordinary life. I examine how the three most influential accounts—the feeling theory, the cognitive-evaluative theory, and the motivational theory—can respond to the challenge posed by the paradox of fiction, arguing that, contrary to a widespread scholarly assumption, the cognitive theory stands the best chance of satisfying both desiderata. Moreover, I show that the motivational theory faces greater difficulties in dealing with the paradox of fiction.</p>