<p>This paper defends an ameliorative approach to remembering, according to which the concept of remembering ought to be revised to promote justice. It will be shown that some recollections bring risk of substantial epistemic, affective, and practical harms and wrongs to those whose behaviours are recalled, preventing them from gaining recognition for their behaviours, expressions of agency, and individuality. Giving those recollections authority, by applying the concept of remembering to them, can cause or compound injustice. Meanwhile, treating other recollections—such as those of people who have experienced trauma—as if they are <i>not</i> genuine acts of remembering by not applying the same concept can cause and compound injustice. Accounts of remembering driven by scientific understandings alone do not suffice to prevent these injustices. Therefore, it shall be argued, the concept of remembering, and its conditions of application, ought to be carefully ameliorated with the explicit goal of supporting justice.</p>