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<p>There are different things we can do, and states we can be in, on the basis of reasons. Among other things, we can act, believe, and get angry, all on the basis of reasons. While important work has been done on these topics, it tends to have been done in separate philosophical subfields. By contrast, this paper concerns basing across these disparate domains. I argue that there is shared causal structure, no matter the kind of basing. The argument generalizes an influential Davidsonian thought in the practical domain: positing causal structure is the best way to distinguish between those reasons that comprise an agent’s basis and those that are idle with respect to the agent’s acting. I conclude by addressing an objection due to Setiya, who explicitly defends the causal disunity of acting and believing on the basis of reasons. Setiya offers a doxastic account of epistemic basing, which is noncausal. I argue that such accounts fail because they cannot distinguish between two distinct ways of failing to respond to one’s evidence.</p>

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The causal unity of basing

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月13日

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  • Christopher Blake-Turner

摘要

There are different things we can do, and states we can be in, on the basis of reasons. Among other things, we can act, believe, and get angry, all on the basis of reasons. While important work has been done on these topics, it tends to have been done in separate philosophical subfields. By contrast, this paper concerns basing across these disparate domains. I argue that there is shared causal structure, no matter the kind of basing. The argument generalizes an influential Davidsonian thought in the practical domain: positing causal structure is the best way to distinguish between those reasons that comprise an agent’s basis and those that are idle with respect to the agent’s acting. I conclude by addressing an objection due to Setiya, who explicitly defends the causal disunity of acting and believing on the basis of reasons. Setiya offers a doxastic account of epistemic basing, which is noncausal. I argue that such accounts fail because they cannot distinguish between two distinct ways of failing to respond to one’s evidence.