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<p>Direct doxastic voluntarism (DDV) holds that we have direct voluntary control over our beliefs. This article offers a modest defence of DDV by focusing on the role in belief formation of what I call <i>existential reasons</i>: reasons a person has to adopt certain actions or attitudes because they wish to be a particular kind of person. I argue that, in at least some cases, a person may choose to believe a proposition because they wish to be the kind of person who would hold that belief. I show how existential belief choices avoid prominent objections to DDV. I conclude by reflecting on the relevance of existential reasons for two specific belief categories: beliefs about legal obligation and beliefs about God.</p>

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Existential reasons for choosing to believe

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月18日

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  • Jonathan Crowe

摘要

Direct doxastic voluntarism (DDV) holds that we have direct voluntary control over our beliefs. This article offers a modest defence of DDV by focusing on the role in belief formation of what I call existential reasons: reasons a person has to adopt certain actions or attitudes because they wish to be a particular kind of person. I argue that, in at least some cases, a person may choose to believe a proposition because they wish to be the kind of person who would hold that belief. I show how existential belief choices avoid prominent objections to DDV. I conclude by reflecting on the relevance of existential reasons for two specific belief categories: beliefs about legal obligation and beliefs about God.