<p>Reflective Equilibrium (RE) is often cited as an influential philosophical method but faces a range of objections, including that it is overly demanding, vacuous, or methodologically irrelevant. This paper identifies a fundamental issue that complicates both the evaluation of RE and broader discussions of philosophical methodology: the lack of clarity about what constitutes a method in philosophy, what we expect from such a method, and what kinds of objections against it are legitimate. By distinguishing between epistemology, methodology, and method, I identify three levels at which RE might be located. The term ‘reflective equilibrium’ is often used to encompass all three, obscuring important differences. I argue that while RE can be conceptualized at each level, for guiding philosophical inquiry, it is most plausible and fruitful to understand it primarily as a methodology rather than a method. Beyond debates about RE, the proposed tripartite distinction may also serve as a helpful framework for reflecting more systematically on how epistemological assumptions, methodological commitments, and the use of methods interact in philosophical inquiry.</p>